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areful economic analysis can identify
policy reforms that improve the efﬁciency
of federally mandated environmental pro-
tection efforts. Like nothing else, good eco-
nomic analysis helps focus our minds on
the inevitable and frequently uncomfortable tradeoffs
between clean air and those things we must sacrifice to
obtain it. Analysis can change the political landscape from
a quest for mythical perfection at any price to a debate about
the price the public should pay for the next incremental
improvement in air quality. Without good analysis, we will
achieve the right level of air quality only by dumb luck.
But government studies of regulations designed to pro-
tect health, safety, and the environment are inherently self-
serving. The same agencies that evaluate performance also
design and administer the very regulatory programs that they
are evaluating. It is hard to understand why anyone should
expect self-examinations to be objective and informative.
Investors want businesses to be audited by analysts without
ﬁnancial conﬂicts of interest. Scientists reject research that
cannot be replicated independently. Consumers flock to
independent testing organizations rather than rely exclusively
on sellers’ claims. Only in the public sector, where bureau-
cracies are protected from the discipline of market forces, do
we rely on self-evaluations of performance.
Interest in more efficient environmental regulation
motivated lawmakers in 1990 to include Section 812 in the
Clean Air Act amendments. Section 812 directs the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (epa) to report to Congress
on the costs and beneﬁts of the federal air pollution control
program. In 1997, epa’s ﬁrst report on rules issued from
1970 to 1990 gave a “best estimate” of net beneﬁts of $22 tril-
lion—roughly the aggregate net worth of all U.S. households
in 1990. We know of no professional economist indepen-
dent of epawho takes that estimate seriously. In the 1999
sequel to its 1997 report, epagave a “central” estimate of $83
billion for the net annual beneﬁt in 2010 of the Clean Air Act
amendments. That estimate did not include the net beneﬁt
of efforts to protect stratospheric ozone, which epa esti-
mated separately.
As we will show, epa greatly overestimated the net
benefits of the Clean Air Act amendments. The agency
deliberately neglected the cost of complying with a well-
known, and expensive requirement of the act and ignored
its own scientiﬁc advisory board’s advice to include indirect
costs. epadescribed its key beneﬁts estimate as a “central”
case, although it is better interpreted as an upper-bound
estimate. It is likely that there will be negligible net beneﬁts
in 2010. Moreover, epa’s focus on aggregate net beneﬁts
obscures the gains that might result from better design and
administration of the clean air program. 
epa’s reports to Congress vividly illustrate the inade-
quacy of self-evaluations of federal regulatory programs.
Congress should abandon the self-evaluation model and
establish an independent analytical agency to review the
costs and beneﬁts of regulatory policies and programs.
OMITTED ALTERNATIVES
both epa’s reports to congress have no value for
legislative or regulatory decision making because, among
other things, they do not analyze a range of reasonable
policy alternatives. In fact, the second report fails to analyze
a single alternative. It tells us nothing about the merits of
incremental policy changes, let alone signiﬁcant changes in
program design or administration. It is silent as to whether
tightening or relaxing air pollution controls would increase
or decrease net social benefits. Yet, such information is
essential to making informed judgments about changes in
laws or regulations. 
Sound economic analysis requires the assessment of
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writing in Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental Health and
Safety Regulation: A Statement of Principles, noted that it is
“important to identify the incremental costs and beneﬁts
associated with differentregulatory policies” (Principle 8 on
p.7, emphasis added). Inspired in part by economists’ views
about sound analysis, presidential executive orders (e.g.,
EO 12866) and guidelines of the Ofﬁce of Management and
Budget also require the assessment of alternatives.
epa’s neglect of alternatives testiﬁes to the triumph of
its institutional interests over responsible policy analysis. The
agency’s reports to Congress demonstrate how it seeks to
control and constrain the role of beneﬁt-cost analysis in pub-
lic debates about air pollution control policy.
UNINFORMATIVE AGGREGATES
what truths hide behind epa’s aggregate estimates
of costs and benefits? The Clean Air Act has many provi-
sions. Which provisions generate the greatest net bene-
ﬁts? Are there provisions whose costs exceed their beneﬁts?
Without the answers, decision makers who care about
controlling air pollution cannot make the best use of avail-
able resources.
Those decision makers will not find the answers in
epa’s 1997 and 1999 reports to Congress. (One exception
is epa’s separate analysis of provisions of the Act protect-
ing stratospheric ozone, but this analysis suffers other prob-
lems.) epa’s Science Advisory Board (sab) complained
repeatedly that the reports failed to disaggregate costs and
beneﬁts. In its October 29, 1999 letter, sabsaid that a “sin-
gle overall, aggregate [beneﬁt-cost] ratio has little practical
relevance, since nobody is considering wholesale repeal of
the [Clean Air Act]” (p. 10).
sab also noted that it had “asked for disaggregation
before and it has not yet been provided.” The board con-
cluded “it will not ﬁnd the analyses in future prospective
studies valid and reliable for their intended purpose with-
out significant disaggregation by title and provision” (p.
11). In other words, without disaggregation, future epa
analyses will be no more useful than the 1999 report, which
sab found of “little practical relevance” (p. 10).
UNDERSTATED AND DUBIOUS COST ESTIMATES
Ignored Indirect Costs The 1999 epareport excludes the indi-
rect costs that arise when government actions exacerbate
inefficiencies in labor and capital markets. Income taxes,
for example, drive a wedge between workers’ productivi-
ty and earnings. That wedge causes workers to supply less
labor, resulting in efﬁciency losses. Air pollution regulations
exacerbate efficiency losses by raising the prices of goods
and services.
The indirect costs neglected by epaare potentially large.
sab’s letter suggests that the indirect costs could be 25 to
35 percent of direct costs (p. 15). epadoes not dispute the
existence of indirect costs; instead, the agency tries to
explain away its failure to account for them by alluding in
its report to the “emerging nature of this literature” (p. 29).
As we discuss later, epahad no such qualms about its abil-
ity to estimate the beneﬁts of air pollution controls.
Unvalidated Cost Estimates  sab did not examine the relia-
bility of epa’s cost estimates. In fact, in its letter, sab
acknowledges having assumed that those estimates were reli-
able:
It was not feasible to review all the input data used
when computing direct costs.  A good deal of the data
are  drawn from EPA’s regulatory impact analyses,
which presumably have undergone review; we assume
such data to be reasonably reliable. (October 29,
1999, p. 8)
That assumption may be inappropriate. For example,
epa asserted that it would cost no more than $10,000 a
ton to reduce emissions as required by the ozone standard
(p. B-37). That assertion has no empirical basis. Moreover,
the epa report admits that, because the ozone standard
cannot be met by currently identiﬁable control measures,
progress may come about—if it is feasible at all—only
through the adoption of measures that are not cost-effec-
tive (p. B-35). 
Excluded Signiﬁcant Costs Most importantly, epaexcludes
the cost of meeting the provisions of Section 181 of the Clean
Air Act (p. A-41). Section 181, which sets mandatory dead-
lines by which the states must meet the national ambient air
quality standard for ozone, may be the costliest and most
inefﬁcient provision of the act. Documents in epa’s dock-
et for its 1997 revision to the ozone standard reveal that ﬁve
cities, including Los Angeles and San Diego, could not meet
the standard even if they were to adopt all the emissions con-
trol measures that epacan identify.
One way of estimating the full costs of compliance is
to mimic epa’s usual method of assessing environmental
risks. To estimate the unobservable risks of death and dis-
ease from low exposures to environmental hazards, epa
typically extrapolates the relationship between observ-
able death and disease rates and high exposures. For a
number of reasons, this method for assessing risks has lit-
tle scientific merit. One reason is that individuals often
have thresholds of exposure below which they do not
experience adverse health effects. But there is no theoret-
ical or empirical reason to assume, as epa does, the exis-
tence of a threshold above which the incremental cost of
controlling pollution would stop rising. 
Using the method of extrapolation outlined in Randall
Lutter’s 1999 paper (see Readings), we estimate that it would
cost $53 billion a year to meet epa’s ozone standard by
2010. Our estimate may well be too low. It excludes Hous-
ton and Galveston, Texas, which must cut nitrogen oxide
emissions by nearly 70 percent to meet the ozone stan-
dard, according to the Texas Natural Resource and Con-
servation Commission. More recent scientiﬁc research indi-
cates that the emissions cuts needed to meet air quality
Regulation 24 Volume 23, No. 3
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(See Winner and Cass, Environmental Science & Technology
[2000].)
Thus, the total annual cost of meeting air pollution stan-
dards for 2010 is likely to be at least $100 billion a year, not
the $27 billion a year estimated by epa. The difference would
still leave a net annual beneﬁt of $6 billion—if one believed
epa’s estimate of the gross annual beneﬁt. But we don’t.
EXAGGERATED BENEFITS
more than 90 percent of the beneﬁts estimated by epa
arise from the reduction of risks from particulate matter
(pm). Those risks are highly uncertain, however, because sci-
entiﬁc understanding of the health effects of pm is notori-
ously weak. According to the National Academy of Sci-
ences, “There is a great deal of uncertainty about the
implications of [epidemiological] findings for risk man-
agement” (p. 2, emphasis added). Apart from a handful of
statistical associations, scientists generally have no direct evi-
dence about the risks of low-level exposures to pm.
epa’s estimated reductions in
pm-related health effects reﬂect only
the statistical uncertainty associated
with a single study by Pope and col-
leagues. Those researchers devel-
oped a statistical model of the asso-
ciation between mortality among
about 200,000 people older than 35
years and outdoor concentrations of
“ﬁne particles” in 50 cities in the early
1980s. We focus here on three
unsubstantiated assumptions made by epain its interpre-
tation of the relationship that Pope and colleagues report-
ed: (1) The reported association between pm and health
effects is causal, (2) that causal relationship extends linear-
ly to very low doses, and (3) the reported association is
estimated using a correct model. We do not deal with other
highly signiﬁcant assumptions, including the assumption
that the sample is unrepresentative.
Association and Causality Calculations based on the
unproven assumption that an epidemiological association
is causal overstate the best estimate. They ignore another
beneﬁt estimate based on the alternative (and also unlike-
ly) assumption that the epidemiological association is not
causal at all. Under this alternative assumption, epa’s esti-
mate of total benefits declines tenfold. Simplification by
neglect of the lower bound is misleading, but that may be
the point. epa knew that causality was unproven but still
described its beneﬁt estimate as “central.”
Linear No-Threshold Dose-Response for PM  epa linearly
extrapolated the association between pm and premature
mortality reported in the Pope study to pmconcentrations
well below those actually observed. That procedure repre-
sents a hidden policy choice rather than a scientiﬁc imper-
ative. Its validity cannot be conﬁrmed or refuted scientiﬁ-
cally, even where a biological theory strongly suggests that
it is false. 
The simple straight line is practically ruled out if indi-
viduals have exposure thresholds below which they do not
experience adverse health effects. If thresholds in fact exist
and relatively few people have high or low thresholds, then
linear extrapolation exaggerates the population risks asso-
ciated with low-level pm exposure.
This journal recently published an article arguing that
the linear no-threshold model can give sensible results
when applied to populations, even if individuals in the pop-
ulation are known to have dose thresholds (see Richard
Wilson, “Regulating Environmental Hazards,” Regulation
(Vol. 23, No. 2). The author provides no supporting evi-
dence that complex phenomena like population risk look
linear rather than, say, S-shaped. As an example of nonlin-
ear population dose-response relationships, consider the
familiar example of alcohol consumption. Lethal doses
surely vary among individuals but exposure sufﬁcient to
achieve a blood-alcohol concentration (bac) of 0.50 grams
per deciliter (g/dl) is probably lethal to 100 percent of the
population. If the linear model worked for estimating pop-
ulation risks, then exposure sufﬁcient to warrant a DWI cita-
tion (bac greater than or equal to 0.10 g/dl in all 50 States
and the District of Columbia) would also be large enough
to kill one-ﬁfth of all persons so exposed.
To its credit, epadeparted from that assumption in the
risk assessment for the pm standard it issued in 1997. The
agency performed a sensitivity analysis showing that a
plausible threshold lowered the population risk associated
with pm exposures in Philadelphia County by a factor of
between two and six. But epa’s reports to Congress do not
acknowledge how thresholds in the relationship between air
pollution and health would lower risk estimates and esti-
mated beneﬁts.
Validity of Statistical Model The results of a statistical model
are valid only insofar as the model is valid; for example, omit-
ting explanatory variables generally biases estimates of the
relationship of interest. The statistical models used by Pope
and colleagues may well display such bias. In the United
States, measurements of personal exposure to pmare high-
er than ambient outdoor pm concentrations because of
indoor sources of particles, such as cooking, smoking,
cleaning, and other daily activities. Given that people spend
a large majority of their time indoors, pollutants from
Regulation 25 Volume 23, No. 3
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accomplice, in pm-related illness and deaths. Pollutants
from indoor sources may be especially important for the
chronically ill elderly, who spend nearly all their time
indoors and for whom the observed epidemiological asso-
ciation with outdoorpm is strongest. 
Weather affects exposure to pollutants from indoor
sources. By increasing indoor-outdoor air exchange rates,
greater average wind speed can lower indoor particle levels
and thereby reduce personal exposure. A 1 percent increase
in average wind speed is associated with a 1 percent increase
in the rate that outdoor air is exchanged for indoor air, hold-
ing other things constant (American Society of Heating,
Refrigeration and Air-Conditioning Engineers 1981). High
air exchange rates reduce indoor particle levels, while low air
exchange rates result in longer air residence time for ﬁne par-
ticles and more opportunity for particle concentrations
from indoor sources to increase. Researchers have found a
negative relationship between wind speed and mortality,
an observation consistent with that phenomenon. See, for
example, Kalkstein and Davis (1989). Yet the epidemiolog-
ical models linking ambient pm and mortality generally
neglect both indoor pm exposure and wind speed. 
Personal behavior also affects exposure to indoor pol-
lutants. In more temperate climates, people spend more
time outdoors and so reduce their total exposure to indoor
pm. Pope and colleagues addressed the possible role of
weather only by saying that “the association between pol-
lution and mortality was not very sensitive to the inclusion
of variables . . . for relatively hot or cold weather condi-
tions” (p. 672). Those conditions, however, seem to be poor
proxies for the meteorological phenomena that affect per-
sonal behavior. A better proxy for the propensity to spend
time outdoors might be the number of daylight and evening
hours that have low humidity and pleasant temperatures. 
Could weather confound measurement of the associa-
tion between pm and mortality? Yes, if cities with lower
ambient outdoor pm and premature mortality also have
stronger winds (which “clean out” indoor air pollution)
and less rain, thereby encouraging more outdoor activi-
ties. As a preliminary test of this hypothesis, we regressed
the pm concentrations used by Pope and colleagues on
annual average wind speed and the number of days of pre-
cipitation of at least 0.01 inches. Both variables correlate with
pm in the expected manner. 
By failing to account for differences in wind speed, rain,
or other determinants of intercity activity patterns, the
analysis by Pope and colleagues appears to suffer from
what statisticians call an “omitted variables bias.” The prac-
tical effect of omitting such explanatory variables may be
to exaggerate the risks posed by ambient outdoor pm. The
Health Effects Institute considered a number of potential-
ly omitted variables but not wind; though there is nothing
to prevent the reanalysis team from considering wind in the
future. No party other than hei will conduct research
accounting for behavioral patterns and indoor-outdoor
exchange rates, because only heihas access to the data of
Pope and colleagues.
Overvaluing Reductions in Risk epaalso exaggerated bene-
fits by using excessively large estimates of the value of
reducing mortality risk. The studies underlying epa’s
approach focus on 35- to 40-year old workers who gener-
ally expect to live another 40 years. Premature mortality
from pm is associated with much older people, especially
those with preexisting health conditions that impair their
quality of life. Those persons may
generally be willing to pay much
less to reduce any given mortality
risk because it has less effect on
their life expectancy and does not
restore good health. In its letter,
epa’s Science Advisory Board clear-
ly communicated that concern to
the agency, stating that the values
epa assigned to reductions in pre-
mature mortality were “likely to be
biased upwards”(October 29, 1999, p. 2). Thus, epa’s report
exaggerates likely beneﬁts by overestimating the likely mag-
nitude of risk reduction obtained from pm controls and
the likely values that beneﬁciaries would place on the risk
reductions they presumably obtained.
QUESTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES 
our ﬁndings permit a striking reassessment of epa’s
estimates. The agency neglected both indirect costs and
the costs of complying with Section 181 in developing its
estimate of the costs for 2010. Adjusting epa’s estimate for
those errors implies costs are about $104 billion in that
year rather than $27 billion, just $6 billion short of epa’s
“central” beneﬁt estimate of $110 billion.  This changes the
benefit-cost ratio from 4.1 to 1.1.  Thus the existence of
any net social beneﬁts is highly dependent on the implau-
sible assumptions epaused to derive its beneﬁts estimate.
While 90 percent of epa’s beneﬁts rest on a dubious foun-
dation of weak epidemiologic associations and heroic
assumptions, technical corrections that reduced these ben-
eﬁts by just 6 percent could eliminate net beneﬁts entirely. 
The poor quality of epa’s reports to Congress raises a
variety of fundamental questions. It is not surprising that
epa’s air office succumbed to institutional incentives to
make its programs look attractive. But how did the errors
in the report survive the administration’s internal quality
Regulation 26 Volume 23, No. 3
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epa’s internal oversight may have been ineffective
because no one was given the authority to perform it. No
firewall separated the reports’ authors from air pollu-
tion program managers. In fact, the authors of the reports
also developed the regulatory impact analyses for a num-
ber of major air pollution regulations and are among the
air program’s most avid defenders. They made the reports
a justification for epa’s air program instead of a disin-
terested examination of the program or the effects of the
Clean Air Act. 
Adequate analytic capability exists elsewhere within
epa to detect and correct the reports’ shortcomings, but
there is no publicly available evidence that those resources
were used in a disinterested manner. Senior staff outside
epa’s air ofﬁce knew, for example, that the cost of meeting
the attainment deadlines set forth in Section 181 would be
very high. Yet the agency continued to prepare a “compre-
hensive” report of the Clean Air Act that neglects this pro-
vision. If epa’s political management intended to monitor
the air office to ensure a policy-neutral and informative
report, its efforts failed.
Science Advisory Board  More puzzling is the ineffectiveness
of the review performed by epa’s Science Advisory Board.
Although the board identified many serious limitations
and defects in both reports at numerous points along the
way, it concluded that the agency had “produced credible
estimates” (p. 16). In requiring that the reports be peer-
reviewed by sab, Congress apparently expected the board
to perform a quality control function. According to the
record of critical letters sabtransmitted and epa’s limited
efforts to address the board’s concerns, sabwas unable to
perform the quality control function that Congress appar-
ently expected.
The best explanation for sab’s ineffectiveness may be
malfunction of parts of the review process. The task set out
for the sabpanel was more like supervising a student’s doc-
toral dissertation than performing academic peer-review. sab
needed to determine whether epa’s reports were substantially
correct, both in their underlying methodology and in their
ultimate results. But effectively performing that task requires
more involvement than sab had.
No panel member had unique responsibility and
authority for the quality of any particular section of the
report. The arrangement departed from standard practice
among dissertation committees, where the chairman is
responsible for making a candidate successfully resolve
material theoretical and empirical questions, and another
member of the committee is typically responsible for super-
vising use of quantitative and statistical methods. Such spe-
cialization is particularly important with interdisciplinary
research. Conforming to this model, epaappointed experts
to sab in part for their diverse interests. Unfortunately,
each board member lacked authority to reject those portions
of the report that fell below relevant professional standards.
sabalso lacked authority to determine that the report
failed to meet minimum professional standards. The
report’s publication was a foregone conclusion—it was
statutorily required and subject to a judicial deadline. sab
could urge and cajole, but it couldn’t say no. It’s as if sabhad
a student it couldn’t ﬂunk.
epa’s air ofﬁce staff played a dominant role in the sab
review process.  They controlled the ﬂow of information to
panel members, limited the time for the panel to review
drafts and supporting documents, and structured the mem-
bers’ interaction. Public meetings where panel members
could express their views were highly compressed and
dominated by epastaff presentations. In contrast, only the
weakest dissertation committees allow Ph.D. candidates
to dominate the process.
OMB Review  A second layer of peer review conducted
under the auspices of the Ofﬁce of Management and Bud-
get (omb) did not fare well, either. Economists from sever-
al departments and agencies (including omband the Coun-
cil of Economic Advisers) participated and quickly identiﬁed
many serious defects in the report, much as they had when
they reviewed epa’s 1997 report. The reviewers’ efforts
were frustrated by epa staff, who refused to consider any
material changes because the report had satisﬁed sab.  epa
used sab as a shield to deﬂect legitimate criticism.
As the judicial deadline approached, federal agencies
agreed only to disagree. epawas forced to insert language into
the report that distanced other departments and agencies (as
well as the administration in general) from the text, thereby
making the report an epa rather than a government-wide
document. epa’s 1997 report to Congress has similar lan-
guage, but we know of no other precedent for such a stark dis-
claimer. Bureaucratic practice strongly militates against allow-
ing sister government agencies to publicly draw lines in the
sand, but the usual practice of glossing over differences was
not followed here. In short, other departments and agencies
were convinced that epa’s results were invalid and unreli-
able. And remarkably, it means the Clinton-Gore adminis-
tration declined to support epa’s analysis and conclusions. 
CONCLUSION
epa’s reports vividly illustrate why government
regulatory agencies should not be asked to evaluate their
own programs. While self-evaluations may be useful for
improving internal management, they are pernicious when
they become a basis for congressional or public views on
substantive policy matters. 
Congress should reconsider how to get authoritative,
policy-neutral, and informative analysis of major programs.
One possibility is to ask the National Academy of Sciences
(nas) to prepare such reports. The academy is widely
regarded as more neutral and authoritative than any gov-
ernment agency. Of course, nas also has its own rarely
recognized limitations. First, the quality of nas reports
varies greatly depending on the composition of the panel—
and especially who chairs it—and on the skills of the staff.
Second, naspanels can stray into policy matters where they
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deter or prevent that from happening, in part because Con-
gress frequently asks the academy to resolve controversial
policy issues behind a façade of science. Third, nasreports
tend to be treated more authoritatively than they often
deserve. Few scientists will publicly criticize an nasreport
regardless of how unscientiﬁc it may be. Finally, because nas
would have to rely on critical information provided by epa,
it would need new procedures to ensure the validity and reli-
ability of such information.
A second approach would be to establish within Congress
the capacity to perform unbiased, authoritative analyses of
major regulatory actions and programs. Efforts to estab-
lish a freestanding congressional ofﬁce of regulatory analy-
sis (cora) have not been successful to date, but steps toward
such an institution have been made despite persistent resis-
tance. On July 25, the House of Representatives passed the
Truth in Regulating Act of 2000 (H.R. 4924), which would
direct the General Accounting Ofﬁce to perform a three-year
pilot project evaluating agencies’ analyses of economically
signiﬁcant regulations. In addition to the challenges of suc-
cessfully incorporating this function within GAO, its pro-
visional nature would make it difficult to attract the 
top-quality staff necessary to mimic a permanent cora.
More generally, however, the success of any congressional
ofﬁce dedicated to regulatory oversight will depend on its
independence from political pressures in Congress. 
Independent oversight would help regardless of whether
self-evaluations end. For example, Congress could direct
ombto perform and publish a formal, written review of the
technical merits of each regulatory impact analysis. omb
staff have considerable expertise and a knack for quickly
uncovering the most salient issues. But ombreports to the
same boss as epa. While a changing of the guard might alle-
viate the problem, political interference will still be just a
phone call away. A future cora also could perform inde-
pendent reviews of agency analyses. Scholars in various
universities and think tanks could also be called on to pro-
vide independent reviews, though their institutional and per-
sonal interests would preclude complete neutrality. 
Which type of oversight is best? We believe that the
limitations of each type of oversight and the obvious need
for a lot more of it warrant greater use of all of the above
institutions. Competition can’t hurt and will surely help.
Congress should refrain from directing regulatory agen-
cies to evaluate their own actions. Instead, Congress should
direct policy-neutral institutions that are independent of reg-
ulatory agencies and protected from political interference
to perform such evaluations. Meanwhile, omband cora
(should such an office be established) ought to perform
formal reviews of all agency self-evaluations. Finally, the
recent ascendance of nongovernmental third-party over-
sight institutions offers a unique opportunity for Congress
and the public to acquire information that governmental
agencies do not provide. Such reforms will weaken epa’s
incentive to disregard legitimate criticism and deter it from
publishing uninformative analyses that lack credibility.
Isn’t that, after all, what Congress intended?
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